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Exculpatory Clauses in Leases
Margaret Mazza*
E XCULPATORY CLAUSES in leases are used in order to free the
lessor from liability for his future acts of negligence. For
the purpose of this article we will assume that there was a legal
duty resting upon the party asserting the clause as a defense. The
validity of such a provision then requires a choice between two
conflicting policies: (1) a person should be liable for the negli-
gent breach of his duty; (2) a person should have the right to
contract freely. The common law developed the rights and duties
of the parties in certain relations and determined that damages
be awarded for the negligent breach of those duties. The basic
relations so determined are those of the common-carrier and
passenger, bailor and bailee, employer and employee, innkeeper
and guest, and landlord and tenant.'
Common law tort liability applies to these situations, except
as modified by the element of contract. What happens to the
common law liability when two parties agree that certain rights
are to be relinquished and duties escaped by the contracting
parties?
History of Exculpatory Clauses in Leases
Every State, by case law or legislation, has regulated the
rights and duties of landlord and tenant. As the renting of prop-
erty became more prevalent, especially due to urban develop-
ment, legislation for its control became necessary. During the
19th century, many States enacted statutes imposing the duty of
premises repair upon the lessor.2 The California code is typical
and provides as follows:
The lessor of a building for the occupation of human
beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the con-
* Manager of a Cleveland realty company; prelegal edu. at Ursuline College
and John Carroll Univ.; and a second year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Buildings, 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155
N. E. 2d 372 (1959); and see n. 42 below.
2 Mont. Rev. Codes, § 42-201 et seq. (1947), enacted in 1895; N. D. Rev.
Code, § 47-1612 et seq. (1943), enacted in 1887; Okla. Stat. Ann., § 41-31
et seq. (1937), enacted in 1910; S. D. Code of 1937. § 38.0409 et seq. enacted
in 1919.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
EXCULPATORY LEASE CLAUSES
trary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and
repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render
it untenantable. 3
"In the absence of an agreement to the contrary" certainly
left room for the use and enforceability of exculpatory clauses.
Justice Cardozo, pin-pointing the problem, stated in Altz v. Lie-
berson4 that:
The legislature must have known that unless repairs
were made by the landlord, they would not be made by
anyone.
Thus, because of the imposition of duties, lessors sought excul-
patory clauses as a means of avoiding them. The use of these
clauses became widespread and their variety now is limited only
by the ingenuity of the legal draftsmen. As legislation followed
legislation and decision followed decision, the States disagreed
as to the validity of exculpatory clauses.
Illinois upholds these clauses and infers in its decisions that
the only way of nullifying the clause is to prove disparity of
bargaining power. In a case which dealt with the rental of busi-
ness property, the Illinois court concluded that there is nothing
contrary to public policy in the use of exculpatory clauses in
leases; these agreements are purely private affairs, and if there
is no evidence of disparity of bargaining power between the
parties, the clause is sufficent to waive the tenant's claims against
the landlord for the alleged negligence.5 In Simmons v. Colum-
bus Venetian Stevens Buildings6 the Illinois court attacked the
reasoning on which its common law is based, but still following
it, found for the landlord. This same State has also upheld the
validity of such clauses for apartment rentals.7
States upholding exculpatory clauses in leases consider free-
dom to contract as an almost absolute right and therefore, dis-
parity of bargaining power is difficult to prove. For example, a
lease with an exculpatory clause was signed by a seventy-four-
year old man. If the man had not renewed the lease, he would
have been required to move a long established business, a hard-
3 Civil Code of Calif., § 1942 (1872).
4 233 N. Y. 16, 134 N. E. 703, 704 (1922).
5 Jackson v. First National Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 144 N. E. 2d 721 (1953) (in-jury occurred on a common stairway).
6 Supra n. 1.
7 O'Callaghan v. Walker & Beckwitk Realty Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d 349, 146 N. E.
2d 198 (1957), affd 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N. E. 2d 545 (1959).
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ship at his advanced age. These circumstances were pleaded as
grounds for disparity of bargaining power, but the court did not
consider this to be sufficient to render the clause unenforceable.8
It has also been ruled that an acute housing shortage does not
establish unequal bargaining power; but there is a split of au-
thority on this question.9
An escape solution to the problem used by many courts is
to construe the clause strictly. In the well-known case of Worth-
ington v. Parker,10 the clause provided that the landlord was not
liable for damage due to leakage in the roof or piping. The
court, in strictly construing the clause, ruled that the landlord
was not liable for damage resulting from ordinary wear and tear,
but that he was liable for misrepair. The rule of strict interpre-
tation of exculpatory clauses is followed in Ohio." In further
limiting the provision, the Ohio rule is that the landlord must
correct conditions which constitute a menace to the public, and
cannot escape liability to persons not on the premises at the
time of harm.12
An example of the application of the public nuisance theory
to exculpatory clauses is found in Godfrey v. West Carolina Pow-
er Co.1 3 The defendant had caused a flooded area to develop,
which attracted disease-carrying mosquitoes, The flooding of the
area did not constitute grounds for action by the lessee because
of a limiting clause, but the court ruled that the facts resulted
in the creation of a public nuisance and therefore awarded dam-
ages to the plaintiff.
Other theories are used by the courts to limit the application
of exculpatory clauses. New York courts have interpreted a
clause relieving a landlord from liability for loss sustained by a
tenant as intended by the parties to limit liability for the negli-
s Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Buildings, supra n. 1.
9 O'Callaghan v. Walker & Beckwitk Realty Co., supra n. 7, which held that
acute housing shortage did not prove disparity of bargaining power. But
in Kay v. Cain, 154 F. 2d 305 (D. C. Cir. 1946) it was held that an acute
housing shortage proved disparity of bargaining power and therefore the
exculpatory clause was unenforceable.
1o 11 Daly 545 (N. Y., C. P. 1885).
11 Mansfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleve. C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 74 Ohio St. 30,
77 N. E. 269 (1906); George H. Kingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R. R. Co., 102
Ohio St. 236, 131 N. E. 723 (1921).
12 Friedl v. Lackman, 136 Ohio St. 110. 16 Ohio Ops. 40, 23 N. E. 2d 950
(1939) (injury occurred on sidewalk and was caused by a window glass
which fell due to a worn sash cord).
13 190 N. C. 24, 128 S. E. 485 (1925).
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gence which allowed the defect to arise, but not for the failure
to repair after the condition arose and the landlord was notified.14
In another case, the clause was interpreted to make the landlord
liable for his affirmative negligence in not repairing a known de-
fect, but exempting him from liability where the cause of the
damage was wear and tear, an inherent defect, or the action of
the elements even when by active vigilance he might have pre-
vented the damage. 15 In a similar fact situation as in the above
two cases, but where no notice was given the landlord and the
negligence was the mere existence of-not the failure to correct-
the defect, the court ruled that the landlord was not liable.16 The
difficulty here is in deciding what was the intention of the parties
or what constitutes affirmative negligence. Clauses explicitly
providing that the landlord shall not be liable for leakage damage,
no matter how negligent the landlord, are enforceable.'
7
Another possible escape is lack of consideration for the limit-
ing clause. Lower rent or additional services to the tenant at no
charge, exchanged for his consent to the clause in the lease, have
been viewed as consideration for the clause, making the contract
enforceable.'
8
Generally limiting provisions in contracts between carrier
and passenger are void and unenforceable. Courts, in finding
for the plaintiff, have put landlord-tenant contracts in the classi-
fication of carrier contracts. By way of example, a passenger in
an elevator has been considered a passenger in the elevator and
not a tenant of the landlord. 19
The element of fraud also can affect the validity of an ex-
culpatory clause. An action was brought for damage due to mois-
14 Garrity v. Propper, 209 App. Div. 508, 205 N. Y. S. 192 (1924); Nyamco
Associates v. Cherniaeff, 152 Misc. 306, 273 N. Y. S. 327 (1934). New York
law is now governed by statute which is discussed below.
15 Kessler v. The Ansonia, 253 N. Y. 453, 171 N. E. 704, affg., 277 App. Div.
290, 237 N. Y. S. 537 (1930).
For the same result in Alabama, see Wheeler, Lacey & Brown, Inc. v.
Baker, - Ala. -, 112 So. 2d 461 (1950).
16 Lowry & Feffer, Inc. v. Mor-ro Realty Corp., 223 App. Div. 621, 229 N.
Y. S. 169 (1928).
'7 Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 285 N. Y. 489, 180 N. E. 245
(1932).
Is Shay v. Sherwood, 66 Pa. Supp. 463 (1917). In this case, hot and cold
water were supplied, with no additional consideration given by the lessee
to the landlord. The same reasoning was used in Manius v. Housing Au-
thority of City of Pittsburgh, 350 Pa. 512, 39 A. 2d 614 (1944).
19 Steiskal v. Marshall Field & Co., 238 Ill. 92, 87 N. E. 117 (1909); Springer
v. Ford, 88 Ill. App. 529 (1899), affd. 189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. 953 (1901).
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ture in a basement. The clause stated that the lessor should not
be liable for damage "resulting from any source whatsoever."
The court ruled that the clause was ineffective because of the
fraudulent statement of the lessor in representing the basement
as dry.20
Licensees of the lessee present another problem. In one case,
a truck driver was injured while picking up the lessee's laundry.
The court denied recovery on the theory that the driver's rights
against the landlord were derived from the lessee. Because of
an exculpatory clause, the lessee would have no claim; hence,
neither did the driver.21 Illinois holds another view: the lessee's
employees are not denied recovery because of an exculpatory
clause agreed to by the lessee. 22
Public Policy Deeming Exculpatory Clauses Invalid
Some States, by court decisions or legislation, have ruled
exculpatory clauses in leases invalid. One of these is New Hamp-
shire, which ruled that one may not by contract relieve himself
of the consequences of future non-performance of his common-
law duty to exercise ordinary care, and that the public policy
of protecting against the negligence of individuals in causing in-
juries was transcendant and could not be waived by contract.23
New York courts originally decided that a covenant to relieve
the landlord of his obligation to repair was valid and not against
public policy. 24 But because of the New York Multiple Dwell-
ing Law, Section 2, courts refused to recognize the validity of
contract provisions which exempted the landlord from liability
for his negligence in the maintence and repair of multiple dwell-
ings.25 Section 234 of the New York Real Property Law, as
amended, strongly expresses the present rule of that State:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in
connection with or collateral to any lease of real prop-
erty exempting the lessor from liability for damages for
injuries to person or property caused or resulting from
20 Blumenfled v. Wagner, 63 Misc. 69, 116 N. Y. S. 500 (1909).
21 Telless v. Gardner, 266 Mass. 90, 164 N. E. 914 (1929).
22 B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N. E. 354 (1905).
23 Wessman v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 84 N. H. 475 (1930); Papakolos v.
Shaka, 91 N. H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941).
24 Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., supra n. 17.
25 Excellent Holding Corp. v. Richman, 155 Misc. 257, 279 N. Y. S. 587
(1935).
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the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants,
or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the
demised premises or the real property containing the
demised premises shall be deemed to be void and against
public policy and wholly unenforceable. 26
In referring to the above section of the statute, one New York
court said that although an individual contract exempting the
landlord from liability for his negligence may not be of any
public concern, the existence of a large number of such agree-
ments unquestionably is a matter of public concern.27
The interpretation and application of Section 234 of the New
York statute involved some controversy. Immediately upon its
enactment, the question arose as to its effect upon leases exe-
cuted prior to its passage. In Hanfeld v. A. Broido Inc.,28 the
court ruled on prospective application, because retroative appli-
cation would give rise to doubts about the Act's constitutionality.
Clauses making the lessee responsible for repairs and liable for
the non-repair of the premises are still valid in New York. Such
provisions have been interpreted as not attempting to exculpate
the lessor from liability.29 It has been further held that, where
the lessor's negligence is "passive," a clause exempting him from
liability to third persons coming on the property is valid because
it is purely an indemnity provsion and therefore not within the
Act.3 0 It would seem that a legislative enactment such as Sec-
tion 234 would settle the matter, but the old common law still
exerts an influence on the courts. Dissenting opinions still are
written, such as in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Wins-
low, 31 where the reasoning of the Kirshenbaum32 case is brought
up and viewed as sound.
Some States have enacted partial legislative changes in order
to control exculpatory clauses in leases of tenements or multiple
26 N. Y. Real Property Law, § 234 (amend. 1937).
27 Katz, Inc. v. East Thirtieth Street Corp., 172 Misc. 873, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 640
(1939).
28 167 Misc. 85, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 463 (1938).
29 Mirsky v. Saeiak Realty Co., 256 App. Div. 658, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 191 (1939).
30 Nixon v. Genung's Inc., 84 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (1948); new trial ordered on
other grounds, 275 App. Div. 1049, 92 N. Y. S. 2d (1949).
31 183 Misc. 754, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 255 (1944).
32 Supra n. 17.
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dwellings. Some typical examples are Massachusetts,"3 New Jer-
sey,34 Pennsylvania, 5 and Ohio.
30
Conclusion
Exculpatory clauses in some other contractual relations
have been declared void and unenforceable because of disparity
of bargaining power or the social consequences of the contract.
Among these are employer and employee,3 7 common-carrier and
passenger,3 8 innkeeper and guest, 9 and bailor and bailee 40 con-
tracts. Comparing the rule of law for the above situations with
the landlord and tenant relation, Justice Bryant in Simmons v.
Columbus Venetian Stevens Buildings41 asked the following rhe-
torical questions:
Is it more socially desirable that people should travel
freely and without danger than that they should have a
safe place to live? . . . Is it any more important that a
man should have a safe place to work than that he should
have a safe place to live? ... Is the guest at an inn under
greater compulsion to find shelter than the tenant who
comes to town to live and work and seeks shelter for
himself and his family? 4'
It should be kept in mind that, in spite of these statements, the
court, compelled by Illinois precedent, found for the landlord.
To illustrate still greater confusion, the bailee would be liable
for damage to an automobile in a parking lot under certain con-
ditions. But the landlord would not be liable for the same damage
in a garage rented in connection with living quarters, if the
33 Mass. (Ann. Laws), Chap. 144, §§ 80-82 (1949); provides that the duty of
maintenance of fire escapes is non-delegable and that the Board of Health
can declare a condition of non-repair to be a public nuisance and require
its repair.
34 N. J. Stats. An., Title 55, § 7-1 (1940); requires the maintenance of the
roof and areas of common use.
35 Pa. Stats. Ann., Title 53 PS, § 25025 (1948); states that every part of a
tenement must be kept in good repair and requires the area in and about
the premises be kept clean and free of dirt, filth, and garbage.
36 Ohio R. C., § 3707.01 (1953) gives the Board of Health rights in the abate-
ment of nuisances.
37 6 Williston, Contracts, § 1751 C.
38 9 Am. Jur., Carrier, § 739.
39 Williston, op. cit. supra n. 37.
40 Ibid.
41 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N. E. 2d 372, 384-385 (1958; rehear. den. 1959).
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lease contained a limiting clause.42 Another interesting situation
would be injury to a custodian who rented a suite in the building
which he serviced. If his lease contained a valid exculpatory
clause, would the landlord be exempt from liability? Or would
the custodian be considered an employee, thereby making the
landlord liable?
If because of the clause the tenant receives a reduction in
rent or additional services at no charge, or the tenant is the sole
occupier of the premises, the validity of the clause is well ground-
ed. On the other hand, where contracts containing a limiting
clause are used in great number and as a matter of course by
realty companies, or when applied to special fact situations, this
question takes on confusing and unfair aspects. After examining
many cases, it is apparent that consistency and judicial equanim-
ity toward the contracting parties must be the aim of those
working with and legislating for exculpatory clauses and their
validity.
42 Arensberg, Limitation by Bailees & Landlords of Liability for Negligent
Acts, 51 Dick. L. Rev. 36 (1946); Oleck, Damages To Persons & Property,
chap. 25 (1957 rev.) as to limitation of liability in contracts of bailment and
carriage.
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